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ABSTRACT: Aim of this work is trying to show, from a mainly theoretical standpoint but with constant ref-
erences to Italian concrete cases, how neoliberalism, even though usually described as a State withdrawal 
from many issues left to individuals’ freedom, would actually represent an increase in forms of State inter-
vention and control. The paper aims to analyze what forms this control may take, starting from current 
economic crisis, finding they are attributable to two scenarios: an explicit centralizing form, analyzed 
through the analytical tools of “state of exception” literature (Schmitt, Agamben); an implicit technical 
form, studied referring to the literature on “government through numbers” (Porter, Power, Miller, Es-
peland, Desrosier). The paper also tries to show, once again through concrete examples, and by compari-
son with Polanyi’s analysis of resistance to ‘900 classical liberalism, how behind the two neoliberal power 
there would be the same strength to impose to consciences, and most of all what would be the conse-
quences of this for the possibility for social movements to try to deconstruct neoliberalism’s discourse, 
and to challenge it by collective action. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The theme of popular sovereignty has become a central issue in Western democra-
cies after the abandonment of a socialdemocratic/Keynesian vision of welfare state, 
and the apparent unchallenged victory of neoliberalism. This latter seems constantly to 
recur as efficient and fast recipe, far from the delays of democratic debate, for periodic 
situations of economic emergency. Aim of this work is trying to show, from a mainly 
theoretical standpoint but with constant references to Italian concrete cases, how ne-
oliberalism, even though usually described as State withdrawal from many issues left 
to individual freedom, would actually represent an increase in State control. The paper 
aims to analyze what forms this control may take, starting from current economic cri-
sis, vantage point from which to analyze the real locus of power, apart from what for-
mally stated for “normal” situations. And also to verify the actual possibility for social 
movement to influence reality, in situations calling into question the status quo and 
thus potentially calling for atypical political actors to take the initiative. 
The apparent inability of value politics in providing solutions to crisis seems to fa-
vour, in public rhetoric, recipes for another kind of “politics”, that of indicators as GDP, 
spread, and so on. Daily political reality shows how concepts like “technicians’ govern-
ment” were not only theoretical elaborations of thinkers of the past two centuries, but 
government tools, silent for most of the time, becoming explicit in times of crisis. Simi-
larly, following an institutionalist vision of right, sovereignty would reside in actual 
State functioning, visible as such, once again, in time of crisis, when rules themselves 
are circumvented. On this basis, Romano (1918) stated that necessity, not the norm, is 
the original power source. Actual sovereignty, generally constrained in its ordinary ex-
ercise, resurfaces in exceptional cases, revealing its hybris usually latent and denied. 
Thus, strands of classical literatures distant from each other seem to indicate crisis 
and necessity as sources of two often conceived as opposite forms of power: the tech-
nical and the authoritarian ones. Starting from the consideration that economic neces-
sity has always been one of the cause of the latter form, and definitely the typical one 
of the first, aim of this work is trying to show how neoliberalism would succeed in 
combining such kinds of power, counterintuitively with respect to its rhetoric of indi-
vidual freedom. 
The paper also tries to show, once again through concrete examples, and by com-
parison with Polanyi’s analysis of resistance to ‘900 classical liberalism, how behind the 
two neoliberal power there would be the same strength to impose to consciences, and 
this could influence social movements’ possibility in trying to deconstruct neoliberalist 
discourse, and to challenge it by collective action. 
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2. Neoliberalism as new power(s) 
 
Neoliberalism is often described as an answer for the “overloaded government”, ac-
cording to which, under the watchwords of privatization, deregulation and new public 
management, there would be a State withdrawal from the direct government of many 
issues, left to economic freedom. The “modest State”, however, should not do less, but 
“more with less”, not oaring but firmly holding the rudder. Confidence in deregulation 
seems only one of the 80’s oversimplifications, and the focus has shifted to better regu-
lation. Opening, however, the question about what “better regulation” means. Official 
rhetoric of neoliberalist institutions talks about an epochal shift from government to 
governance, with an opportunity to enlarge civic engagement, participatory practices, 
subsidiarity and power devolution (Oecd 2001). Yet, this would be, in the best hypoth-
esis, only a normative precept, if not a strategic attempt of reproposing old practices 
under a more appealing form (Donolo 2004). 
Beyond rhetoric, such change appears to respond to neoliberal perspective, accord-
ing to which State withdrew from direct administration, while preserving, and even ex-
panding, its powers of control in strategic sectors. It is often forgotten that, together 
with the end of explicit centralization, the rise of neoliberalism brings also the end of 
compromise between democracy and capitalism, at the expense of the first and with 
the unbalanced victory of the latter (Lo Schiavo 2014). Moreover, there has been grow-
ing space for the rhetoric of “evidence-based policies”, according to which better regu-
lation is such if based on better knowledge, and knowledge is better if concentrated on 
economic aspects and expressed in a quantitative manner. Hence, economic criteria 
presented as scientific, objective and neutral evidences, guide the action of national 
rulers. Who, however, are far from deprived of their authority, but rather, sometimes, 
increase their power of acting politically, even if not democratically in a strict sense: 
the power to impose, implement and enforce such technical recipes. 
Thus, neoliberalist power would be attributable to two main scenarios. The first is an 
explicit form in which democratic guarantees are bypassed through centralization and 
simplified procedures, justified by economic necessity and urgency. Such form will be 
analyzed by applying to concrete cases the analytical tools of “state of exception”, of 
which economic necessity is a classic case. No coincidence if, in recent years’ crisis, the 
main blaming target in anti-austerity groups’ rhetoric is precisely the theft of people’s 
sovereignty by technocrats. Who, on the base of economic imperatives, deprive popu-
lar power through authoritarian actions (technical or “unelected” governments, Par-
liament emptying, loss of sovereignty in favour of international organizations not con-
trolled by people…), centralizing authority in the hands of executive power, at the 
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State, EU or supra-state level. Not only in economic and social policies, but pervasively 
on every aspect of society, and especially in sectors deemed strategic for quantitative 
growth (education, infrastructures…). 
The second form of power is the implicit one, related to Foucault’s concept of “gov-
ernment at a distance”, through which neoliberalism would impose its values using the 
soft weapon of economic expertise, in particular through measurement of everything, 
starting from individual, organizational or State performance. Reference, in this case, 
always applied to concrete cases, is the literature on “government through numbers”, 
according to which neoliberalism needs to quantify every life aspect, decontextualizing 
and thus depoliticizing numbers. 
 
 
3. The explicit form: economic necessity and extraordinary powers 
 
Starting from the explicit form, with the progressive affirmation of neoliberalist dis-
course we can find a growing infringement of European directives’ framework, quite 
contemporary built. This prescribes to go beyond mere representative model, reconcil-
ing decision models usually seen as opposed, such as “technocratic” evaluation, expert 
and independent from political pressure, and participatory engagement of all possible 
stakeholders. Both these, as we shall see, would actually be manifestations of the same 
implicit form of neoliberal power in the age of governance, seeming to leave no room 
for the classical form of centralized power. Nevertheless, over the years, there has 
been increasing cases in which, for reasons having to do, mainly, with economic neces-
sities within a neoliberal view, delegations, exemptions and simplifications compared 
to usual procedures have been used, in order to allow a quick response to conditions 
presented as extraordinary, similar to the concept of “state of exception”. 
In exceptional situations, Schmitt (1972) noted, rules, protections and guarantees 
applicable to “normal” situations are suspended in a way provided within the legisla-
tion itself. As noted by Agamben (2003), exception is outside the legal system, and yet 
belongs to it, legalized suspension of current order, made by the same authority guar-
antor of its respect. Exceptional cases, or presented as such, there is no shortage 
(Marazzita 2011): international terrorism, major events, pandemics, public order, im-
migration, hydrogeological instability, natural disasters, waste emergencies, and, more 
topical than ever, economic crisis (Montedoro 2012). As there is no shortage of deroga-
tions/exceptions which, from within “normal” order, are provided in an equally excep-
tional way: deregulation, abuse of executive decrees, special commissioners for emer-
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gencies, extraordinary simplified procedures, abuse of trust issue, decisions required 
by suppositories impositions from markets and “undemocratic” EU. 
It is indeed remarkable that, often, derogations from European system are rhetori-
cally justified as necessity to respond European impositions concerning economic crite-
ria. Economic growth has always been one of the primary reasons for the identification 
of moments requiring exceptions. From an Italian point of view, obvious, in this sense, 
the reference to Monti’s technical government at the height of the crisis, continually 
appealing to necessity as legal source (Fusaro 2012), and to the unquestionable nature 
of technical choices in front of partisan irrationality. Indeed, this was often described, 
by anti-austerity groups, not only as a delegation from politics to technique, but also as 
an undisputable and undemocratic authority centralization in the hand of executive 
power, not balanced or controlled. Admittedly, not only Government’s birth and func-
tioning, but most of all its acts, are conceivable as derogation dictated by economic ne-
cessity stated by technical indicators. Only as an example among many others, 2011 
Finance Act, emphatically called “Save-Italy Decree” in order to point out its exception-
ality, permitted even to company negotiation to derogate in pejus to Civil Code protec-
tion. Even more controversial, l.Cost. 1/2012 introduced the principle of balanced 
budget in Constitution, affecting «the very notion of sovereignty, the protection and 
promotion of social rights and, ultimately, the balances underpinning the parliamen-
tary form of government» (Parmigiani 2015, 864). 
Not only Monti’s government, however, neither only financial and social policies, nor 
only intervention within the crisis, follows such fate. Almost every aspect of public ac-
tion, anyway affecting economic primacy typical of neoliberal thought, underwent a 
similar “exceptionalisation”. Preeminence of economic necessity on standard proce-
dures is at a maximum in environmental issues, usually conceived in terms of trade-offs 
with respect to economic choices (Lastrico and Gasparini 2014), with the case of Ilva in 
Taranto, and consequent “Save-Ilva decrees”, as paradigmatic example among the 
most recent. Obviously, crisis functioned as a rhetoric multiplier with its charge of ur-
gency and necessity, as evidenced by the genesis of the equally emphatically called 
“Unlock-Italy decree” by Renzi’s government, subsequent to the technical one, or the 
“Anti-crisis decree” by the last Berlusconi’s one, previous to it. 
This latter, containing “urgent measures to draw national strategic framework in re-
sponse to the crisis”, introduces simplified procedures in many issue deemed strategic 
for economic growth, also providing “special provisions for speeding up the executive 
procedures of projects included in the national strategic framework, in the name of the 
particular urgent reasons related to the contingent financial situation”. Thus avoiding 
the normal democratic protections in the design of works identified as strategic to 
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Government’s discretion (Sandulli 2008). Another issue, in which development logic 
seems to prevail over ordinary legislation, is, in fact, that of major strategic infrastruc-
ture. On this ground, the reference to the role of simple multiplier of neoliberal power 
played by the crisis is clear, since such thrust towards centralization and simplification 
was already present in 2001, after the revival of neoliberalism but long before the out-
break of the crisis, with the Legge Obiettivo (Goal Law), wanted by the government 
Berlusconi II. This provides a strong return to derogatory decision centralism within the 
design of large projects considered of strategic interest for economic investments, sig-
nificantly, all confronted with movements’ oppositions. Aim is to streamline decision-
making at the central level, bypassing tiresome negotiations with local authorities, and 
concentrating any power in the hand of the Government. 
In these cases, regardless of the degree of engagement formally stated, sovereign is 
who has the monopoly of ultimate decision within situations presented as exceptional. 
The prevalence of a power (holder of emergency sovereignty) on the others (holders of 
established sovereignty) would remain latent, ready to recur not only within an ascer-
tained state of exception, but also to impose when we are in a state of exception, in 
order to offer itself as necessary power. In this respect, exceptional sovereignty can be 
found more often than only in emergencies as economic crises, which would work only 
as multiplier of possibilities for new exceptions, for the creation of a permanent state 
of exception. In fact, important decisions have always been taken outside popular 
power, and even more in neoliberal age, though continuously propagandizing freedom 
and participation (Scotto 2008). Within economic imperialism, indeed, almost every life 
aspect, considered in its economic fallout, could fall among such “important decisions”, 
that have to be kept rigidly separated from public scrutiny and transferred in an ex-
traordinary way to institutions only indirectly democratic, when not only and openly 
technical. To be set aside, in these cases, is the same representative principle formally 
behind every decision, although not only rhetoric, but also legal norms, more and more 
often formally prescribe to even exceed such representative principle towards a more 
direct engagement. Economic crisis would function, also in this case, only as a powerful 
legitimizing multiplier for trends already in place, through which exceptionality is insti-
tutionalized and becomes the norm (Agamben 2003), within the permanent state of 
exception of neoliberalism. 
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4. The implicit form: technical objectivity and depoliticization 
 
The form of power analyzed above is an explicit one, in which political authority 
does not try to hide itself, but rather makes itself visible in order to be recognized as 
necessary. Such political strategy is by no means exclusive to current times, having 
characterized any era especially in periods of crisis. Nevertheless, with the advent of 
neoliberalism, and the proliferation of things conceived as crises under the economic 
dominion over any other consideration, also space for state of exception seems to mul-
tiply. However, beyond that, there would be also a more implicit, less visible but not 
less important kind of power, having to do with depoliticization (Pettit 2004) through 
the naturalization of standards and indicators instead obtained through bargaining be-
tween public and private actors. Also such form of power is not exclusive to neoliberal-
ism, but, conversely, neoliberalism made of it one of its main features. As Daly and 
Cobb (2007, 288) state, «in the Middle Ages holy thought had to be expressed in Latin; 
today it must be expressed in numbers»: technical expertise, particularly if expressed 
in quantitative form, represents the main source of legitimation for public choice, after 
the neoliberal turn more than in the past. In particular, following Harvey (2007), finan-
cial accounting had a role in imposing neoliberal consensus, being central for legitimiz-
ing neoliberal discipline and its production of indifference, as called by Hibou (2015). It 
would have been exactly the holy nature of economic data, and therefore their need to 
be excluded from democratic scrutiny in order to preserve their purity, to have helped 
«the ascendancy of neoliberalism as a hegemonic world» (Arnold 2009, 56). 
Technical indicators and quantification are the instrument for legitimizing choices as 
evidence-based policies, giving a neutrality aura to particular worldviews and power 
relations. Who has the legitimate power to impose the problem framing, barricading 
behind the alleged neutrality of scientific data, would deny both uncertainty and con-
flict, denying with them also the depoliticized nature of technical standards. These lat-
ter would depend by power balance among economic actors, but can rely on the uni-
versal legitimacy of techno-scientific rationality. This diplomacy of the technicians «is 
all the more legitimate, apparently, because accompanied by references to the demo-
cratic nature of the process of norms elaboration, and to scientific and technical data 
on which those norms are based» (Borraz 2009, 40). It bases its legitimacy on the use 
of expertise, stating objectively what is right. However, it is mainly the large industrial 
interests to have the resources to mobilize scientific data, as well as a direct interest in 
normalization, while other players, including public authorities, are often in a situation 
of dependency from data providers. 
Valerio Lastrico, Power and resistance in the neoliberal age 
 
365 
 
In this sense, technocracy would be a political and partisan form of power, pursuing 
depoliticization by showing as objective and neutral what is nothing but a compromise 
among interests, values and frames of one or more hegemonic groups (Lastrico 2015a). 
Thus naturalizing data representative only of a particular frame, the economistic one of 
cost-benefits analysis. This would happen in particular through the emphasis on quanti-
fication and measurability, which on the one hand would provide policymakers with 
the supporting and legitimizing arguments of scientific objectivity, hiding, on the other, 
political criteria guiding those choices (Desrosières 2011). Therefore, spreading a vision 
taken for granted and subtracting it from democratic discourse, resulting in a power 
delegated to an elite of experts. Government though the “avalanche of numbers”, as 
Hacking (1982) calls it. 
According to Perry-Kessaris (2011), commodification and quantification would be 
different aspects of economic imperialism, and particularly of neoliberalism (Gibbon e 
Henriksen 2012), on every corner of society, starting from right (Cortese 2015). Quanti-
tative indicators impose themselves as guide for public choices, until their crystalliza-
tion in juridical norms perceived as neutral (Krever 2013). Furthermore opening the 
door to legitimated state of exception, in which juridical guarantees as division of pow-
ers and representative control are bypassed. Indicators and standards would be central 
to the spread of neoliberalism as common sense, for its progressive transformation in-
to taken for granted, because of its indisputable objectification (Thévenot 2011). 
This would happen, in particular, through the importation of accounting standard in-
to the field of policies and performances evaluation. Neoliberalism would need to 
make everything quantifiable, measurable through a universal unit like money, decon-
textualizing numbers, depriving them of any other consideration and then depoliticiz-
ing them (Sukys 2010). Therefore neoliberalism would re-propose the attempt of clas-
sical liberalism, described by Polanyi (2000) and stopped by social resistances as first of 
all labour movement, to create a self-regulated market in which everything is trans-
formed into goods, into something quantifiable through the attribution of a market 
price, subordinating the same society to market rules. Money would be only one 
among many possible standard of commensuration (Espeland and Stevens 1998), even 
if historically the most important, but it became hegemonic, as Centemeri (2012) 
notes, when the utilitarian approach of neoliberalism also became hegemonic, homog-
enizing and converting everything in an economic language governable by finance, be-
coming a mode of power (Garapon 2012).  
Being crystallized in a hegemonic meaning system, monetization is widely taken for 
granted and invisible as political process, denying that such measurements are not ob-
jective and neutral, and reveal nothing more than a particular interest and worldview. 
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They are not only attribution of a price (evaluing), but most of all attribution of a nor-
mative value (valuing) (Lamont 2012). Market competition is only one of possible “or-
ders of worth” (Boltanksi and Thévenot 2006), but with the progressive shift towards 
neoliberalism succeeded in becoming common sense (Ogden 1995). Especially if it in-
troduces itself under the rhetoric appearance of participative, network capitalism 
(Boltanski and Chiapello 2005). That, as we shall see, can be a problem for the possibil-
ity of resistance and deconstruction of such a framework by collective action. Although 
neoliberalism impose itself as hegemonic, it is also true that, on the other hand, be-
cause of the simultaneous era of reflectivity and crisis of certainties, the opportunity 
for alternative worldviews should grow. Yet, social mobilizations seems not to succeed, 
if not minimally, in challenging such state of things, mainly because of the strong legit-
imation in civil society of the implicit and the explicit power as a whole. It is then inter-
esting to analyse how two so different forms of power can combine. 
 
 
5. The two powers together: post-democracy as frame internalization 
 
According to Polanyi (2000), with the rise of liberalism, economy was naturalized 
and subtracted to political control at the very moment in which it took over as guiding 
principle of society. Nonetheless, «such institutional model could not work, if society 
itself were not someway subject to its requirements» (ivi, 92). Following Polanyi, self-
regulated market of classical liberalism did not work exactly because of social re-
sistances, first of all from labour movement. So what about the new attempt by ne-
oliberalism? Are there similar resistances? Compared with classical liberalism in indus-
trial society, the era of neoliberalism is characterized by greater complexity, leading to 
a growing number of periods of crisis and transition, potentially useful for the decon-
struction of common sense and for the rise of resistance. Nevertheless, exactly through 
such recurrent crises, state of exception succeeded in proposing itself as salvific, and 
technocracy appeared as a crucial resource for the government of societies. 
For Meynaud (1966), reducing all problems to economic efficiency solvable through 
technical methods prefigures not political power suppression, but a techno-
bureaucracy requiring strict planning and programming, quite similar, following Supiot 
(2015), not to classical liberalism or to an implicit power-knowledge, but on the contra-
ry to the most explicit power of soviet despotic regimes. «A neoliberal order is not, 
then, one in which the state is hollowed out (the aspiration of laissez faire liberalism). 
The state is reconstructed, not dismantled» (Sikka and Willmott 2009, 399). Starting 
from the vantage point of the last financial crisis, some see in the governments of 
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Monti in Italy and Papademos in Greece an abdication of democracy and sovereignty 
towards European and international economic technocracy. Others, by contrast, read it 
as a political strategy, a kind of aristocracy propagandizing partisan interests, hiding 
behind the specter of necessity and technical expertise.  
Regardless of the true nature, they were described in a manner close to the defini-
tion of “technical state” by Schelsky, as a meritocracy where there is perfect overlap 
between the most qualified people and who decide validity and type of qualification. 
Through these lenses, it would be possible to look not only at Monti’s government, but 
also at the next, and political, Letta’s one and the so-called European “autopilot”. 
Technical state, in Schelsky’s formulation, does not provide for a government neces-
sarily directed by technicians, describing rather a regime in which politicians are sub-
jected to automatisms and constraints of technique, but getting from this latter the le-
gitimacy to act coercively and extraordinarily (Funnel 2007; Espeland 1997). As Harvey 
(2007) states, neoliberal hegemony prioritizes market-driven competition as the pre-
ferred mechanism, while admitting a role for the state for supporting this priority. 
Convergence of the two apparently different neoliberal powers is therefore similar 
to a technical state, which in turn is ascribed by Brunkhorst (2008) in the strain of post-
democracy, since “technical state, without being undemocratic, takes away its sub-
stance to democracy”. From the meeting of the two powers would come out «a cen-
tralized government, inscribed in a logic of technocratic production of public policies, 
designed to plan society (…) The number of subjects entitled to participate in decision-
making is reduced. Space of decision is limited and not visible» (Rui 2004, 33). Crouch 
(2003) describes post-democracy as a paradigm, dominant since the success of neolib-
eral ideology, resting on the one hand on the negative conception of State of classical 
liberal tradition, on the other on an elitist vision. In the words of Rancière (2007, 98) 
 
declaring themselves simple managers of local fallouts of historical world necessity, 
governments contrive to eliminate democracy. Inventing supra-state unaccountable in-
stitutions, governments realize their goal: to depoliticize political issues, to put them in 
places closed to democratic contentious places (…) to rejects ancient conflict, getting 
used to objectify problems passionless. 
 
The two manifestations of neoliberal power would support each other, creating a 
sort of post-democratic power in the sense of Crouch. On the one hand ranking, rating, 
benchmarking, GDP and spread would be instrumental to power centralization (Bruno 
2009), technical devices allowing a power revolution without major institutional 
changes (Rouvroy and Berns 2010; Hansen and Porter 2012), whereas on the other 
power centralization would allow legitimization to quantifying normalization (Berland 
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and Chiapello 2009). For Supiot (2011), governance based on quantitative indicators is 
suitable to striking juxtapositions with the tools of autocratic planning. What is implicit 
through technique, only becomes explicit in case of extraordinary power. 
Behind the two neoliberal powers, there would be the same strength to impose to 
consciences (Cata Baker 2002). There are several studies on neoliberal quantification as 
biopolitical power devoted to the creation of governable individuals (Miller and 
O’Leary 1987), example of power a là Foucault, able to forge Homo Liberalis mentality 
(Lambert and Pezet 2012). Neoliberalism therefore becomes an internalized self-
discipline, more than an external pressure against to which, potentially, to resist (Pop-
py 2013; Sauder and Espeland 2009). Actually, something similar would happen also in 
the visible form of power. Indeed, even in this case we can find a tacit acceptance of 
neoliberal recipes as almost natural, that we cannot do otherwise given necessity and 
urgency dictated by crisis. Hence, state of exception category comes into play. Especial-
ly because, thanks to numbers suitable to demonstrate such necessity, exception is 
transformed into a usual decision-making tool, technique of government (Simoncini 
2008), secret weapon of power (Cabiddu 2010), so much so to get largely internalized 
determining even the shape resistance can assume (Espeland and Sauder 2007). Thus, 
neoliberalism would be naturalized in common sense, becoming the hegemonic 
framework taken for granted within which even opposing movements are forced to 
move (Davis, Kingsbury and Merry 2012). 
One of the most discussed issue is that of education and research. Quantified evalu-
ation of individual performance (for Italy: INVALSI test, statistical accounting in Nation-
al Scientific Habilitation), ranking of universities and reviews, are only few example ful-
ly studied of commodification through numbers, at the expense of any other consider-
ation, as a form of biopower (Sauder and Lancaster 2006; Piller and Cho 2013). In par-
ticular, it has been analyzed how, instead of creating a strong movement against such 
program, people affected by these choices take them for granted, natural and neutral. 
Quantitative performance measurement not only represents a pressure for students, 
teachers and universities to adapt, but is introjected as indisputable. Therefore, rank-
ing becomes an interiorized self-discipline, more than an external pressure against 
which to resist. However, it is interesting how, in the Italian case, this same issue has 
been touched also by the more explicit form of power. The thrust towards perfor-
mance in educational organization and the appeal to the necessity of reforms going in 
this direction, are the base also of Renzi’s “Good school” proposal to create the figure 
of the super-headmaster, with enormous discipline powers. 
Neoliberalism would then be a sort of hegemonic cognitive-normative master-frame 
(Snow and Benford 1992), no longer recognized as such because self-evident, natural-
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ized and taken for granted. And, as a result, removed from discussion, since its being 
institutionalized in cultural practices makes it invisible and exempted from the same 
reflectivity which would scratch its intractability (Schön and Rein 1994). Neoliberalism, 
in the terms of Advocacy Coalition Framework, acts in fact at the cultural level, the 
most difficult to change, that of deep core beliefs, affecting normative and ontological 
assumptions of the involved actors as a general framework for their life, shaping their 
worldview regardless of specific policy sub-system. In this sense it is the most insidious 
power, preventing the basic capability of naming, thus impairing the ability of social ac-
tors to find an alternative solution and to take action in collective mobilization. 
 
 
6. What forms of resistance to neoliberalism? 
 
Are there, in neoliberalist era, resistances to marketization comparable to those reg-
istered by Polanyi in classical liberal times? What forms do such resistances take? The 
hypothesis followed here is that the nature of hegemonic frame assumed by neoliber-
alism influences even the forms of reaction. Because, paraphrasing Benedetto Croce in 
the sense suggested by former Italian President Napolitano, often criticized for having 
been one of the actors of neoliberal power in its explicit form, “we all cannot define 
ourselves as not liberals”. If this would be true, also more organized, critic and politi-
cized minorities would see their resistance efforts forged by the same master-frame 
they wish to challenge, without succeeding in deconstructing it. 
Indeed, such resistance seems to take two main forms. The first is trying to demon-
strate that neoliberal assumption of being based upon solid objective evidences is by 
no means true, using the same technical tools in order to demonstrate the opposite. 
The second one is trying to short-circuit neoliberalism by opposing to depoliticization 
of the implicit power, and to centralization of the explicit one, a bottom-up re-
politicization. 
At the end of industrial society, with the crisis of certainties, scientific and economic 
development would have lost, following Beck, the nature of non-politics that politically 
neutralized its action, and people would start reclaiming the right to be a relevant 
knowledge source both in political and technical systems. On the latter side, “outsid-
ers” would become aware that their experiences are worth nothing until not scientifi-
cally proven (Callon 1998). Consequently, people begin to transform into many small 
anti-experts, breaking the monopoly of rationality of technique. Thus violating, as Negri 
(2012) says, the principle of capitalist detention of knowledge, by using the same 
methods allowing a capitalist decision passing off as technical. On the other side, 
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awareness arises that to present a problem as technical would often be just a way to 
protect it from discussion. On the contrary, to recognize its social dimension means 
admitting the possibility of discussing within more or less extended arenas. Within this 
context, it is possible to read the call for greater participation, and the claim for “hybrid 
fora” (Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe 2009). How can such strategies being somehow 
forged by the economistic master-frame? 
 
 
7. First strategy: scientification 
 
Even some of the most critical subjects seem not to be immune to the thrust of 
technical objectivity as democratic guarantee against failure and particularism of party 
politics (Porter2007). Taking the example of local conflicts, in which social movements 
face the application of neoliberal thought in issues deemed strategic for economic 
growth, we can verify how protest arises frequently as claim for greater engagement of 
local people, likely to remain frustrated, and even overtaken by the application of ex-
traordinary procedures and exceptional powers, if not by explicit repression of dissent. 
Therefore, over time, movements often take firsthand the task of deconstructing, 
through the same scientific weapons used by authorities to keep out protesters’ irra-
tional claims, rational decision-making objectivity. To report as such system does not 
comply with even the basic rules of the technocratic paradigm of which is the flag, 
which in this case is considered by movements a more democratic guarantee than the 
simple imposition of an indisputable political solution. 
Paradoxically, it spreads within such movements the idea that technical and objec-
tive data can be stimulus for those dialogue and participation that the formally demo-
cratic political process in neoliberal frame seems not to be able to ensure anymore. 
The emphasis on the supposed objectivity of numbers invoked e.g. by No-Tav move-
ment, is particularly interesting, because it goes exactly in the opposite direction than 
expected from the claims for contamination of knowledges expressed by the same col-
lective subject. In this sense the movement, despite the intention to undermine the 
paradigm underpinning the choice, ends up for standing as a bulwark in defense of ob-
jectivity, neutrality and democracy of technical data, against political, and therefore 
undemocratic and partisan, attacks from political authorities. The appeal to data seems 
to spring from deep frustration and disappointment towards politics, seen as colluding 
with economic interests, and with respect to which, however, technique seems to offer 
greater guarantees also from a democratic point of view. A technique more democratic 
than the same low quality democracy. 
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Nevertheless, the strategy of playing on the same field movements want to chal-
lenge, instead of deconstructing it, may also have some side effects. Following Harvey 
(2007), the reaction from some movements, proposing to consider alternative data to 
those instrumental to commodification, should be rejected, because accepting quanti-
fication is just another expansion of neoliberal project in the appearance of objectivity. 
Further limiting the possibility of its deconstruction. According to such vision, move-
ments, in order to be successful, should conceive technocracy as means of expanding 
neoliberalist market ideology. Against which, as in Polanyi’s analysis concerning appar-
ently distant times, every reaction seems legitimate. This would lead to more critical 
repertoires of action, like rejecting economic compensation, refusing to quantify 
health, labour and human rights (Rosga and Satterthwaie 2009), but also promoting 
true participatory claims, and not being afraid of struggle. 
 
 
8. Second strategy: participation 
 
Although technique is often referred to as a neutral guarantee against partiality and 
discretion of politics, the downside would be that technique itself would actually have 
conventional and discretionary nature, although hidden by its scientific legitimacy, and 
democratic institutions should balance this power, and act as warranty. Contrary to the 
accusations of irrationality generally aimed at those who, outside the narrow circle of 
technicians, dare to challenge or ask about their work, many subjects believes that the 
best way to control discretion power is to develop instruments of public scrutiny. 
The common background for subjects quite different from each other seems to be 
the idea of participation as a panacea for all the ills of delegitimized politics. Participa-
tion identified as repoliticization of what, through depoliticization, have been stolen 
from democratic debate. It is clear the trust in procedural tools referring to Habermas, 
author widely known and appreciated within many movements. Deliberative practices, 
bringing social rationality into decision-making, would allow reversing what Habermas 
defines colonization of the world of life by instrumental rationality, helping to prob-
lematize neoliberalism as «a dogmatic (i.e. unquestioned) universal approach» (Salais 
2012, 237). 
Participatory claim is undoubtedly important, for the critical thrust it may have in 
deconstructing both explicit and implicit power, but also, paradoxically, as a tool to 
maintain the status quo by using rhetoric, without having an impact on reality. Major 
problems, however, may not come from a top-down strategy (centralism through dia-
logue), but from bottom-up good faith, transforming engagement itself in a master-
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frame through which discourses are structured, regardless of the actual, often weak, 
effects. The “deliberative imperative” (Blondiaux and Sintomer 2002) «sometimes 
takes the traits of an ideology, but it does, in most cases, at the price of a circumven-
tion of conflict (...) in this way, elites yield undoubtedly more to an ideology of consen-
sus, rather than to a neoliberal one» (Pinson 2009, 143). 
A purely procedural vision like Habermas’s one would remain tied, following Fou-
cault, to a legal-discursive conception à la Rawls, in the context of which power is a su-
perstructure built around relationships already established. Instead, for Foucault, pow-
er would be more subtle, but more pervasive, therefore more difficult to challenge 
looking solely at the procedure, if this keep on reproducing the same power-knowledge 
system. Power, as biopower, would give rise not only to what resistance is exerted 
against, but also to the shape resistance can take. This latter should therefore not stop 
at the procedural level, but continuing towards the deconstruction of discourses taken 
for granted, through which subordinates are used to think. 
 
 
9. Neoliberalism as a cultural trait, and capability of resistance 
 
Even once democratically criticized, and scientifically proven, the low rationality of a 
model technocratic on the one hand, authoritative on the other, it does not mean to 
automatically achieve a collective action able to get closer to a new model, as many 
simplistic enthusiasms wish. First, technocratic paradigm shows to keep virtually intact 
its legitimizing strength, especially in a period of politics decay, and of defeat for “costs 
of democracy” supporters, faced with markets’ diktats presented as objective and ra-
tional. On the other hand, also centralist and top-down instances seem not to give way, 
often in compliance with technical demands, coming from abstract but personified 
markets, for simplifying decision-making. 
Economic freedom implies limits to political freedom (Buffoni 2014). Hence, the 
more dominant a vision geared towards as great as possible economic freedom, and 
towards necessity as legal source for restoring the conditions of economic freedom, 
and the greater the possibility of legitimately requiring extraordinary powers by na-
tional governments. Which, in turn, would be largely heterodirected by international 
markets (Lanzalaco 2015), through the cogency and apparent neutrality and objectivity 
of technical standards convergence, namely through the power of numbers that, while 
favouring market uniformity as the dominant political value to the detriment of other 
possible values, hide we are talking about politics and values (Negrelli 2014). 
Valerio Lastrico, Power and resistance in the neoliberal age 
 
373 
 
The linkage between the two powers would pass therefore through a self-fostering 
mechanism (Cortese 2014, 804): 
1. economic orders of worth invade every social sphere, starting from politics and 
law. Which means making everything measurable in order to tag a price (com-
moditization); 
2. on the basis of such master-frame, founded on technical standards, policies of 
global finance institutions (IMF, WTO, World Bank) transform specific economic 
beliefs in binding, naturalized and objectified legal instruments (Espeland and 
Vannebo 2007); 
3. on the one hand, national states’ policies must adapt to such legal instruments; 
on the other, policy-takers will be brought to take for granted such measures’ 
necessity. This allows the introduction without particular difficulty of a state of 
exception, capable of accomplishing the goals identified in a discretionary man-
ner by technical indicators (Carrer 2014); 
4. policies must be measured in terms of conformity to the system of technical 
standards created at the international level, result of political agreements, but 
lived as objective data; 
5. such measurements are internalized, making accepting the «demolition of the 
fundamental rights culture through the widespread use of macroeconomic indi-
cators as engines for “necessary” reforms» (Dani 2013, 350). Thus enabling new 
states of exception. 
The keystone of neoliberal power, maybe more than other kinds of power, is then 
the internalization of neoliberalism as a master-frame. Let us turn to Polanyi (2000) 
and his analysis of classical liberalism. He praises the various forms of resistance to lib-
eral homogenisation, instead accusing all those forces uncritically accepting the alleged 
objectivity of economic science, which would conversely base itself on the ideological 
assumptions of self-regulated market. Such an axiom mandates to shelve any other 
considerations in favour of «a mystical readiness to accept the social consequences of 
economic improvement, whatever they may be» (ivi, 45). So progress is transformed 
by «the stubborn and vehement insistence of liberal economists in their mistakes» (ivi, 
182), in a real creed, based on the one hand on the apologetic claim of economic laws’ 
scientific validity, on the other on the proud defence against criticism according to 
which «the incomplete application of its principles was the reason for all the difficulties 
attributed to it» (ivi, 183). Polanyi understands the insidious character of this defence, 
oriented to inhibit any political control over commodification of nature and society. 
The apologists, in his words, «continuously repeat that liberalism would demonstrate 
its merits, and that responsible for our ills is not the competitive system and the self-
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regulated market, but, on the contrary, the interference with that system (...). In con-
sequence of this defence liberalism spiritualizes itself, because, against the evidence, it 
becomes the champion of progress against the dark conservative forces opposing to it» 
(ivi, 185). 
If in industrial society, however, there were reaction to liberalist creed, with the 
growing complexity of postindustrial society it seems as, for many, it would be too 
costly to problematize and take action against neoliberalism, accepting more and more 
its recipe as indisputably true. In order to avoid conflict and cognitive costs, ordinary 
citizens, even those demanding greater participation in minute issues, in major themes 
seems to be sensitive to the needs of economic actors, whose frames would be intro-
jected becoming hegemonic (Hendriks 2002). This could explain why «neoliberal (reci-
pes) were so successful at occupying the spaces of common sense and the popular 
logics of calculation of economic and political possibilities. While their claims to science 
no doubt have something to do with it, it is just as true that it is the popular approba-
tion of such discourses that has legitimated their claims to scientificity, especially in the 
face of their continued failure (most visible in current crisis)» (Grossberg 2010, 309). 
The problem of resistance against neoliberalism may be, therefore, that this latter 
has become so strong, as a naturalized worldview, and somehow cognitively reassur-
ing, with its simple recipes in an increasingly complex world, to unconsciously contami-
nate even the mind-set of collective subjects which should be the most critical towards 
it, as the various left-wing organizations. So let us make some brief examples from Ita-
ly, without any presumption of completeness, but only in order to support the theoret-
ical hypothesis. 
 
 
10. Leftist parties (and liberal consensus) 
 
With this premise, here we do not focus on radical parties, but on the greater cen-
tre-left one, Democratic Party (PD; before: Leftist Democrats, DS). Furthermore, for my 
purpose, I look at it from a very particular point of view: that of possible influence by 
social movements. Finally, I take as reference movement not a strictly anti-austerity 
one, but a subject born from a local conflict: No-Tav movement. As far as influence 
from radical movements to less radical parties is concerned, we can find how organized 
social pressure can drive changes in party system, and then in policies, in an unex-
pected direction. Focusing on Italy, we can find in the past decades even a conservative 
party like Christian Democracy (DC) someway influenced by a so different movement 
as the feminist one, as analysed by Piccio (2014), whereas national level PD appears 
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willing to explicitly remain aloof from any contamination by No-Tav movement (Piazza 
2011). 
One possible explanation is that local movements, setting the goal of overcoming 
current development model, put in contrast with parties’ legitimacy bases, much more 
than how much feminist movement did. The latter, in fact, acted more at a cultural 
level, not questioning capitalist system. Apart from genre consideration about electoral 
constituency, even for DC, with strong investment of a cultural kind in Catholicism and 
traditional family, it could be easier to make concessions on a cultural level, than on 
that of the call into question of the party itself in its role of last defender of economic 
liberalism against communist threat. Territorial movements, conversely, are in a irrec-
oncilable conflict with a party, as PD, whose cultural level seems to be conspicuously 
less important (being the unsuccessful synthesis of Catholic and ex-communist souls), 
seeming to put, as almost sole base of aggregation, to embody the true and credible 
representative of Italian post-Washington Consensus and moderate neoliberalism, bet-
ter and more than Berlusconi’s right-wing (Piazza 2001). In this way, for PD to accom-
modate influences from such movement would be contrary to the very party’s base. 
Such specific suggestion, taken from a very lateral point of view, serves only to a 
well-known consideration: for social movement to influence reality, they have to face 
with adequate political opportunity structure. In the case of neoliberalism, this seems 
not to be the case, since majoritarian party systems reveal a quite impressive unanimi-
ty on economic recipes. What is worst, who introduced the first and more disruptive 
neoliberal policies were, often, precisely centre-left parties’ governments (as those of 
Mitterrand, Schroeder, Gonzales, but also Prodi), namely those which should be more 
sensitive to social movements’ demands, providing them with suitable opportunity 
structure for influencing reality. 
 
Parties, defining themselves leftist, operate against masses’ social rights and political 
dignity, while playing the role of convincing no-power people that what you need is satis-
fying the system’s logic. Meritocratic fable is the core of this ideology of subordination 
(Urbinati 2015). 
 
 
11. Trade unions (and economic urgency) 
 
Also in the case of trade unions, I take into account only the peculiar perspective of 
concertative unions’ reaction in two particular moments: technical governments of 
early 90’s, called to introduce some of the first neoliberal measures, and 2011 technical 
government, called to solve the crisis by introducing austerity policies. Both executives 
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took neoliberal decision, in a situation of both economic and political crisis, and, in 
both cases, unions more or less accepted such decisions in order to prove their respon-
sibility in exceptional moments, without resorting to struggle. Nevertheless, the two 
case are different for the method adopted by governments towards unions’ inclusion. 
With DC and PSI overwhelmed by Tangentopoli, and PCI in full transformation, 
emergency governments of early ‘90s, lacking of electoral legitimacy, tried the way of 
social legitimacy by carrying forward a strong demand of consultation (Gualmini 2012). 
I.e. by a new re-politicization, albeit of a different type from party politics, a surrogate 
of parliamentary democracy. Unions increasingly became the indispensable social 
structure for governments trying to move on the path of economic recovery. Their 
support was necessary for the executives in order to make economic austerity socially 
accepted. Unions, in this case, did nothing to prevent the introduction of neoliberal 
measures. On the contrary, by supporting the reforms and giving up conflict, they be-
came somehow “complicit”. Instead, the next Berlusconi’s first government would 
have ended up, for opposite reasons, to assign unions a relevant political role: to guide 
the social opposition against right-wing government’s new neoliberal policies (quite 
similar to technical executives’ ones on the merits, even if not in the method), at a time 
when the political opposition appeared weak. 
The same thing happened with the following centre-right executives, but not with 
the centre-left ones, so calling into question other possible explanations, out of neolib-
eral power, linked to unions’ party reference. What is anyway interesting is the change 
in unions’ behaviour passing from last Berlusconi’s government, facing labour opposi-
tion to its austerity policies without consultation, to technical Monti’s one, even wors-
ening both the merits and the method. Nonetheless, «the climate of political confron-
tation allowed to move in few hours from radicalization to consociativism, and even, at 
some stages, to subordination to the government» (Cerruto and Facello 2013, 88), 
notwithstanding the same urgent economic conjuncture. 
Returning to the difference between technical executives of the early 90’s and 
Monti’s government, in both cases parties were weak and delegitimized. Nevertheless, 
whilst the first needed to lean on social partners receiving legitimacy by them, in the 
second delegitimized parties are counterbalanced by a government strong and able to 
benefit of large internal and international legitimacy precisely because technical and 
exceptional. Claiming for itself both neoliberalist powers: explicit and implicit. One 
cannot do otherwise than having a strong government, invested with exceptional pow-
ers, because numbers, most notably the spread, tell us that it is necessary so, that we 
unquestionably find ourselves in a state of exception. 
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In this way, making national institutional trajectories converging towards a standard-
izing model, even without the need for institutional major changes, but through a 
“conversion” of existing institutions (Baccaro and Howell 2011). Unions, not even invit-
ed to decision-makers’ table as it was for the other emergency governments, made 
even less than then, almost completely giving up to any active role, leaving the way 
open without even disturbing (but for non-concertative unions, cfr. Lastrico 2014a). 
 
 
12. Social movements (and their limits) 
 
Therefore, both leftist parties’ and trade unions’ fail to oppose a resistance against 
neoliberalism seems to have something to do with delegitimation of party politics. This 
is truer in the case of social movements, trying to challenge both technocratic neolib-
eralism, and despotic and corrupt representative system, through the two aforemen-
tioned strategies of participatory claim and arguments’ scientification. If in the first 
case the rhetoric of “people” against “caste” is well known, also in the second politics 
delegitimation is central, opposing objective arguments to distrust toward politics (Por-
ter 2007). 
Yet, both proposed solutions are not at all contrary to the meaning system and nor-
mative framework of neoliberalism, which seems to have shaped the resistance against 
it, probably largely invalidating any concrete possibility of deconstruction. On the hand 
of transformation from critique to expertise, to accept, as many movements do, the 
field proposed by the hegemonic frame, may mean helping to merely reproducing 
domination mechanisms instead of building an alternative (Marx 2013). Indicators, in-
deed, from their social legitimacy and claim to objectivity, are often able to influence 
not only decision-making, but also opposition. This implies, in turn, a further step to-
wards the unquestionable nature of technical data: accepting criteria proposed by pub-
lic authorities or industrial property means legitimizing the “ideology of numbers” 
(Chelli and Gendron 2013). 
On the hand of participatory rhetoric, considering, with Habermas, deliberation as 
the solution to market imposition over world of life, means not questioning the proce-
dure and letting goals and collective identity in the background, together with conflict 
(Lastrico 2013). One of the acknowledged limits of many anti-neoliberal movements 
seems to be the creation of new subjects through participatory tools as the aim in it-
self, to the detriment of achieving goals, also because of vagueness in goals required by 
political transversality necessary for the aggregation of new subjects (Lastrico 2015b). 
These “networks without a cause” (Lovink 2011), however, are likely to break on inter-
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nal differences (De Leonardis 2008). The deliberative imperative often seems an at-
tempt to overcome difficulties in constructing collective identity, due to capitalism pas-
sage from industrialism to informationalism, just using tools arising from this passage: 
horizontality, networking, communication arenas. The doubt is if participatory tools, 
rather than creating a new kind of collective, would reproduce precisely the model cre-
ated by the changes in work and welfare, identified as causes of the end of collectives: 
that of “collection of individuals” (Castel 2003) confined in privatism, spaced out by 
multiple, temporary and superficial campaign mobilizations. A networked individual-
ism, using authors like Castells and Wellman, «a class of disaggregated millions, delud-
ed to be free because parts of social networks. If and when conflicts explode, these are 
peripheral events (some segments of precariousness…) that do neither change the 
character of global order, nor crack its organicity. To try it out, think about this: many 
strategies developed to make possible the individual resistance to this holistic logic are 
producing the opposite effect» (Urbinati 2015). Therefore, even participatory rhetoric 
seems to fully fit neoliberal model (Formenti 2008), and network to be a hegemonic 
interpretation useful to the connectionist and individualist “new spirit of capitalism” 
(Borghi 2011). 
Furthermore, the combination of such often supposed as opposite strategies may be 
the more invalidating for the possibility of concrete resistance. Experts, not legitimized 
democratically but by virtue of their expertise, are thought as exempt from controls, 
checks and balances on the base of external and undeniable technical constraints, 
without falling into democratic conflicts and incompetences. Never as in the case of re-
cent economic management, experts would act more like lawyers for a political solu-
tion, rather than as analysts acting on the base of objective criteria. Nonetheless, it is 
interesting that none of the hostility against financial regime seems to be aimed 
against economists who not only provided the arguments, but also sought the influ-
ence on public policy (Grossberg 2010). If social movements’ claims are directed to-
wards participation against political caste, but not against technique because of an in-
trojected confidence, in large part are likely to miscalculate the target, so making pos-
sible resistance irrelevant in many cases. 
 
 
13. An open conclusion: a pessimistic scenario 
 
As seen, what most unites the two neoliberal powers is depoliticization, which 
would lead to expropriation of political participation, without explicitly denying it but 
rather continuously promoting it. After the crisis of traditional representative politics, 
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the way chosen by movements seems to be, on the one hand, participatory/network 
rhetoric as valid procedure beyond specific goals and collective identities, and, on the 
other, flattening on technical expertise considered as neutral and objective solution to 
political bias. Both strategies seems to have much to do with distrust towards tradi-
tional politics, not surprising contemporary to neoliberalism advent. 
The debate on the economic crisis, and on the alleged “markets’ dictatorship”, 
seems to be concerned on the vexed question of democracy-technocracy binomial. 
Many collective subjects, at least among those developing a critical view on the matter 
(and this, as seen, is far from obvious), read a conflict between the two principles. As-
cribing technocratic aspirations, however, to fully political attempts to depoliticize 
dominant values, not to a real domination of technocracy as opposed to politics. Con-
traposition is seen not with politics as such, but with a particular form of politics: dem-
ocratic and especially participatory one. The real opposition, therefore, is between a 
more or less authoritarian politics pretending not to be such (neither political, nor au-
thoritarian), and a different kind of politics, democratic and increasingly more partici-
patory (Lastrico 2014b). 
Thus it seems to glimpse a direct link between the rhetoric of “caste”, and that of 
technicians as defenders of a dominant value system to which all major political par-
ties, including the left, would refer. Besides, choices presented as technical and com-
pelling seems to make disappear even the previous minimum of political competition, 
confirming the substantial consensus among main political parties, instead of being po-
tential institutional partners for social movements, leaving them without effective 
channels within representative structures (Pharr and Putnam 2000; Cain, Dalton, Scar-
row 2006). 
Indeed, representative institutions are increasingly subjected to a double, and ap-
parently opposite, attack: on the one hand the tendency to use a technocratic decision-
making; on the other, the request for more participatory processes. Under this second 
aspect, in the opinion of various authors (Dalton 2004; Nye, Zelikow, King 1997), this 
suggests a lack of trust in actors traditionally conveying participation by mediating bot-
tom-up political questions (Inglehart 1999). Hence, distrust may not be addressed to-
wards democracy as a whole, but rather towards representative institutions in order to 
overcome them. New forms of participation would therefore be in many cases forms of 
potentially critical citizenship (Norris 1999). A significant minority would evaluate as 
good not the evidence-based policies, but those not only achieving goals, but also satis-
factory with respect to the process by which decisions are taken (Lastrico 2015c). Nev-
ertheless, such claim is definitely far from a role for people in decisions affecting their 
life. This, very narrow in any field, seems to be impenetrable in case of policies involv-
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ing two strong adversaries for popular power: the role of technical arguments and the 
necessity and exceptionalism characterizing the policy at stake. The point is that partic-
ipation cannot be taken for granted. It may be widely advocated in theory, but is much 
less popular in actual practice. 
It is therefore interesting to analyze possible adherence with the literature opposed 
to that on democratic experimentalism, i.e. that centred on “stealth democracy”, ac-
cording to which people’s majority just does not want to question status quo, in order 
to avoid democratic conflict. In this case, distrust towards democratic institutions 
would be attributable, at the opposite with respect to previous view, precisely to its 
democratic nature. Democratic and therefore intrinsically confrontational, cognitively 
and emotionally costly, especially because of the growing social facts’ complexity of 
postindustrial age. According to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002, 2), 
 
most people have strong feelings on few if any of the issues the government needs to 
address and would much prefer to spend their time in non-political pursuit. Rather than 
wanting a more active, participatory democracy, a remarkable number of people want 
what we call stealth democracy. 
 
Taken for granted the role of neoliberalism in both technocratic governance and 
power centralization, this explanation seems to be useful for the analysis of the tacit 
social acceptance of neoliberal master-frame in its implicit and explicit form. Indeed, 
under such view, distrust in institutions would actually be directed only against demo-
cratic politics, whereas unaccountable authorities like both technical and public order 
institutions would be seen as possibility to delegate, without the need of questioning 
the frame, as in the case of neoliberalism seems to happen. Proof of this could be the 
large confidence in Monti’s executive from many sectors of civil society in mobilization 
at the end of the last Berlusconi’s government. These appear to have largely aban-
doned the critical intentions once set aside delegitimized party politics, embracing with 
confidence competents’ executive hailed as able to solve the economic failures whose 
blaming falls on politics incompetence (Zamponi 2013). It is therefore to be noted how 
the credibility of technocratic proposal, even in the sectors of civil society most critical, 
organized, progressive and willing to direct participation such as those acting in mobili-
zations (so far from those wanting a stealth democracy), seems to maintain, and possi-
bly increase, its attractiveness in the face of political parties’ delegitimation. 
How is it possible the coexistence of claim for stealth and participatory democracy? 
For Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, who show little political interest and commitment are 
more likely to put the attention on the process, hoping not to participate, than on the 
content of decisions, they do not understand or are not interested in. People with 
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greater interest in politics, rather, are more concerned with policy content, fully under-
standing and having a position about. Nonetheless, as seen, also for the more militant, 
process have a growing importance, although for the opposite reason: common people 
are interested in process because they do not want to participate and do not care 
about the content; militant people are interested in the process, even at the expense 
of the content, because they want greater participation. Desire to participate is some-
thing, after all, a starting point and the most important, since affecting what Appadurai 
(2013) calls “capability to aspire”, to imagine and reframe a different future at a cultur-
al level which even politics rely on, in a context where many others seem to have large-
ly introjected the neoliberal recipe of democracy without people. In either cases, how-
ever, it seems difficult to witness, in short term, mobilizations able to change reality. 
In the terms of Polanyi, commodification of labour and territory determines the dis-
appearance of public space, milieu for possible resistance to the same commodifica-
tion. As De Leonardis (2015) remarks, years of welfare cuts and privatizations have not 
only polarized inequalities, but also silenced demands from society: privatization pow-
ered privatism. Even participatory thrust, if not accompanied by the identification of 
common goals, identity narrative and organizational structure, seems to respond more 
to a desperate adaptive reduction (De Leonardis 2010) in front of the evidence of 
widespread individualism, than not to allow a fertile collective mobilization. Ultimately, 
participatory quiet revolution (Sabel 2001) is like to be by no means a revolution. Thus, 
contrary to theories closer to these forms of democratic experimentalism, according to 
which “remedy to participation problems is more participation”, the flattening on ex-
pertise and participatory rhetoric, used by certain movements, would do nothing but 
increasing neoliberalism hegemony (Davies 2010), according to which, paraphrasing 
Polanyi’s critique, “the only remedy to neoliberalism failures would be even more ne-
oliberalism”. 
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